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T
he secondary market for mortgage
loans is an important part of the U.S.
housing finance system. The Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
have traditionally dominated the secondary mort-
gage market for conforming loans. However, com-
petition in this market may be increasing as a result
of mortgage purchases by Federal Home Loan
Banks (FHLBs). Increased competition, in turn, is
likely to have implications for interest rates paid
by homebuyers and for the risk profiles of the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that dom-
inate this market.
The FHLB System is made up of twelve regional
wholesale banks that are cooperatively owned by
their member financial institutions.1 Like Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, the FHLB System is a GSE
created by Congress to support residential hous-
ing finance. Historically, the FHLB System has
achieved this mission by making loans to its
depository institution members secured by resi-
dential mortgage loans while Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have provided credit guarantees on
mortgage-backed securities or purchased mort-
gages for their own portfolios. 
In 1997, however, the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Chicago began purchasing pools of conforming
mortgages under its Mortgage Partnership Finance
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Program.2 Today, nine FHLBs offer this program in
conjunction with the Chicago FHLB, and the
remaining three offer their own Mortgage Purchase
Programs. All of these programs use a risk-sharing
arrangement whereby member institutions manage
most of the credit risk associated with the loans
while the FHLB absorbs the market risk.3 As a
result, members now have a more complete menu
of alternative ways of funding a pool of conforming
mortgages with the three housing GSEs. These
options include
1. selling the mortgages to Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac for a one-time cash payment, 
2. selling the mortgages to an FHLB in exchange
for a one-time cash payment as well as a stream
of credit enhancement fees, 
3. swapping the mortgages for a security guaran-
teed by either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or
4. holding the mortgages funded by an FHLB
advance.4
Each alternative other than the first exposes a
depository institution to credit risk, market risk, or
both. Furthermore, the specific choice of how to
fund a pool of mortgages—including whether to
deal with a housing GSE at all—depends on the rel-
ative prices of these risks in the context of the GSE
programs, regulatory capital requirements, and the
cost of issuing liabilities.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
Over time, membership in the FHLB System
has been liberalized and is now open to all deposi-
tory institutions as well as certain other financial
institutions. A stock purchase is required for mem-
bership, and while this stock is not tradable, it is
redeemable at par after a notification period.9 As
of year-end 2002, total membership in the FHLB
System stood at 8,011 institutions: 5,886 commer-
cial banks, 1,390 thrifts, 660 credit unions, and 75
insurance companies.
The FHLBs are wholesale financial institutions,
which offer credit products, investment products,
payments services, and custody services.10 As of
December 31, 2002, the consolidated balance sheet
for the FHLB System reported total assets of
almost $764 billion. Advances to members were the
largest category of assets ($490 billion), followed
by investments ($206 billion) and mortgage loans
($61 billion).11 Although mortgages are only about
8 percent of total assets, this share represents a
significant increase from year-end 2001, when they
were just 4 percent of total assets. 
The principal funding source for the twelve FHLBs’
operations are consolidated obligations issued in
the form of bonds and discount notes. The FHLBs’
Office of Finance issues this debt, for which all of
the FHLBs are jointly and severally liable.12 As of
year-end 2002, the FHLB System had consolidated
obligations outstanding of almost $674 billion; the
majority of these were fixed-rate issues. 
By year-end 2002, the FHLB System had equity
capital totaling $36 billion, or 4.7 percent of total
assets.13 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Mod-
ernization Act of 1999 established capital require-
ments and a new capital structure for the FHLBs.14
This legislation required the Finance Board (1) to
promulgate new capital regulations establishing
regulatory risk-based and leverage capital require-
ments for the FHLBs and (2) to outline the different
classes of stock that an FHLB may issue and to estab-
lish the various rights and preferences associated
with each class. The Finance Board published its
final capital rule on January 30, 2001, and all twelve
FHLBs have filed their new capital plans and had
them approved by the Finance Board.15 Each insti-
tution has up to three years from the approval date
of its respective capital plan to implement its new
capital structure.16 Box 1 describes the new capital
structure and minimum regulatory capital require-
ments for the FHLBs.
The FHLBs’ new capital structure and capital
requirements may have implications for the long-
term prospects of their mortgage programs. Before
examining these issues, however, the discussion
The FHLB mortgage programs represent a small
but growing part of the secondary conforming mort-
gage market. In 2002 the FHLBs acquired $45.7 bil-
lion in conforming mortgages from their members,
about 2.4 percent of the $1.9 trillion in originations
that year. However, the year-over-year change in
the stock of mortgages held on the consolidated bal-
ance sheet of the FHLB System rose 119 percent
between 2001 and 2002.5 Future growth of the
FHLB mortgage programs appears to hinge on
these cooperatives’ ability to effectively manage
their required regulatory capital through either new
equity offerings or by moving assets off their bal-
ance sheets.
This article describes the various mortgage pro-
grams offered by the FHLB System, analyzes the
evolving competitive environment in the secondary
conforming mortgage market, and identifies impli-
cations for this market. It does not delve into legal
and political questions of whether the FHLB System
should compete in the secondary mortgage market
or whether such participation should be limited.6




he FHLB System was created in 1932, in the
midst of the Great Depression, to increase the
supply to thrift institutions of long-term funding for
mortgage loans. As a GSE, the FHLB System bene-
fits from various provisions in its federal charter
that result in lower operating and funding costs,
including exemptions from federal, state, and local
taxes, a $4 billion line of credit with the U.S. Treas-
ury, and an exemption from federal securities
registration requirements.7 Taken together, these
benefits confer a subsidy on the FHLB System,
which the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2001)
estimates to be $3 billion in 2000.8 The Federal
Housing Finance Board (Finance Board) regulates
the FHLB System for both mission compliance and
safety and soundness.
The Mortgage Partnership Finance Program
allows members to sell conventional or 
government-guaranteed mortgages to their
regional FHLB. In exchange, members receive
payment for the assets, plus a monthly fee to
manage most of the credit risk.1. The twelve FHLBs are located in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Dallas, Des Moines, Indianapolis, New York,
Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, and Topeka.
2. Conforming mortgages are those with balances below limits established for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. For single-family
mortgage loans, the conforming loan limit was $300,700 in 2002 and $322,700 in 2003. 
According to Inside Mortgage Finance (2003b), conforming mortgage originations in 2002 totaled over $1.9 trillion, or about
76 percent of all originations. Specifically, conventional conforming mortgage originations in 2002 were about $1.7 trillion, and
conforming loans accompanied by government guarantees (either from the Federal Housing Administration or Veterans
Administration) totaled $187 billion.
3. In this article, credit risk refers to the risk of monetary loss in the event of borrower default, and market risk refers to any
loss in market value of financial assets due to changes in interest rates. 
4. In addition, of course, a depository institution could hold the mortgages and fund them with sources other than an FHLB
advance, such as deposits. 
5. As of year-end 2001, the FHLB System held $27.7 billion in conforming mortgage loans. This figure increased to $60.6 billion
one year later. The difference represents new acquisitions net of repayments and prepayments.
6. A group of thrifts and thrift trade associations located in California, Texas, and Ohio unsuccessfully challenged the legality
of the Federal Housing Finance Board’s regulatory approval of the Mortgage Partnership Finance Program in 1997. See Bair
(2003) for a brief discussion of the legal arguments. 
7. See, for example, U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2001) for a discussion of all of the benefits afforded to the FHLBs,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. 
While the FHLB System is exempt from federal income tax, it is obligated to make payments to the Resolution Funding
Corporation in an amount equal to 20 percent of net earnings after operating expenses and expenses related to the FHLBs’
Affordable Housing Programs. 
8. This figure represents the estimated gross subsidy to the FHLB System. The net subsidy retained by FHLB stakeholders for
2000—after accounting for the benefits of lower interest rates accruing to mortgage borrowers—is estimated to be $2.7 billion.
9. This notification period has historically been six months. However, under new FHLB capital regulations, class A stock will
retain the six-month notification, but class B stock will require a five-year notification. 
10. The specific products and services the individual FHLBs offer can often be found on their respective Web sites. Visit
<www.fhfb.gov/FHLB/FHLBS_banks.htm> for links to all twelve FHLBs. 
11. Investments of the FHLBs include mortgage-backed securities, federal funds sold, commercial paper, and Treasury and
agency (other GSE) debt securities. 
12. Like debt obligations issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the FHLB System’s consolidated obligations benefit from an
implicit federal guarantee, which serves to reduce funding costs. Looking at average funding spreads over the 1995–99 period,
Ambrose and Warga (2001) estimate that FHLB long-term debt securities trade at 44 basis points below comparable fully
private firms. 
13. Of this amount, $35 billion was subscription stock, and the remaining $1 billion was retained earnings.
14. See Title VI of the Federal Home Loan Bank System Modernization Act of 1999. 
15. See Federal Register 66 (20), January 30, 2001, 8262–8321.
16. As of year-end 2002, the FHLBs of Seattle, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati had implemented their capital plans.
17. The Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta also recently announced that it would operate a Mortgage Purchase Program
(Inside Mortgage Finance 2002).
18. Seller-members also receive fee income to service the loans sold to the FHLB. These fees, which are the same as those pro-
vided to lenders by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, are 25 basis points annually for conventional loans and 44 basis points annually
on federally guaranteed loans.
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details the structure of the mortgage programs and
their variants. 
GSE Secondary Conforming Mortgage 
Market Programs
A
s noted in the introduction, the FHLB System
offers two broad classes of mortgage programs.
The Mortgage Partnership Finance Program rep-
resents a single mortgage program offering stan-
dardized products with most functions consolidated
at the Chicago FHLB. During 2002 the Mortgage
Partnership Finance Program purchased $27.9 bil-
lion in mortgages, and at year-end there were
$42.3 billion of these loans outstanding. The Mort-
gage Purchase Programs offered by the FHLBs of
Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Seattle are operated
individually in the sense that differences in terms and
features exist.17 The Mortgage Purchase Programs
funded $17.8 billion in residential mortgages during
2002, and $18.3 billion of these loans were outstand-
ing as of December 31, 2002. 
The Mortgage Partnership Finance Program.
The Mortgage Partnership Finance (MPF) Program
allows members to sell conventional or government-
guaranteed mortgages to their regional FHLB. In
exchange, members receive payment for the assets,
plus a monthly fee to manage most of the credit
risk (typically on the order of 10 basis points
annually on the outstanding principal balance).18
Under the MPF Program, the FHLBs hold the20 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
T
he new FHLB capital structure and capital
requirements were established by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999
and instituted by the Finance Board.1
Capital Structure
As a condition of membership in the FHLB
System, eligible financial institutions must pur-
chase stock in their regional FHLB. Two classes of
stock have been authorized for issuance at FHLBs:
class A and class B. This stock is redeemable at
par six months (class A) or five years (class B)
after written notice from the member of its inten-
tion to redeem. The addition of class B stock makes
FHLB capital much more permanent because all
stock had previously been redeemable at six
months’ notice.2 Moreover, each individual FHLB
sets its own terms to determine the minimum stock
investment for members, but an FHLB must also
ensure that such subscriptions are sufficient to
meet its minimum capital requirements, which
are described below. 
As of July 2002, the Finance Board had
approved the capital plans of all twelve FHLBs.3
While Finance Board regulations give each FHLB
up to three years from the approval date to
implement its capital plan, as of year-end 2002
three FHLBs had already done so (Seattle, Pitts-
burgh, and Cincinnati). A review of the twelve
FHLBs’ capital plans yielded two general insights.
First, stock issuance will be heavily concen-
trated in the more permanent class B stock. In
fact, only two FHLBs have elected to issue any
class A stock. Second, all FHLBs delineated
stock purchase requirements according to both
membership and levels of activity. Membership
stock requirements are based on total assets or
mortgage-related assets while activity-based
requirements are based on either advances,
acquired member mortgage assets, or some com-
bination of the two. 
Capital Requirements
The FHLBs are now subject to statutory capi-
tal requirements equaling the greater of either a
minimum capital-to-assets ratio or a risk-based
capital calculation. 
Two minimum leverage requirements are
imposed on FHLBs. The unweighted requirement
is that total capital (class A stock, class B stock,
retained earnings, and general loan-loss allow-
ances) is not to be less than 4 percent of total
assets. A weighted requirement sets this standard
at 5 percent but multiplies permanent capital
(class B stock and retained earnings) by 1.5. The
capital plans suggest that the FHLBs will meet
their minimum capital requirements primarily
with permanent capital.
The risk-based capital standards faced by the
FHLBs account for credit risk, market risk, and
operations risk, with required capital under the
risk-based standard equal to the sum of the
charges for the three individual components.
The total credit risk requirement for an FHLB
is equal to the sum of credit risk capital charges
for all assets, off-balance-sheet items, and deriv-
ative contracts.4 In the regulation, these indi-
vidual capital charges are presented in tabular
form for advances, mortgages, rated exposures
(that is, tradable assets, off-balance-sheet items,
and derivative exposures), and unrated assets.
For advances, which are overcollateralized, cap-
ital requirements vary according to term: four
years or less (7 basis points), four to seven years
(20 basis points), seven to ten years (30 basis
points), and over ten years (35 basis points).
For mortgages, or acquired member assets, the
requirement is based on the level of external
credit support (so as to create securities ratings
equivalents) and subordination. Capital require-
ments for rated assets are delineated according
to eight asset quality categories and five matu-
rity buckets. Finally, all unrated assets, except
BOX 1
Description of New Capital Structure and Capital Requirements for FHLBs
1. The new capital structure and capital requirements can be read in their entirety at 12 C.F.R. (Code of Federal Regulations)
930. The U.S. General Accounting Office (2001) provides a more complete discussion and analysis of the new capital
structure and capital requirements.
2. Under the previous capital subscription requirements, each member was to purchase FHLB stock in an amount equal to
the greater of 1 percent of the member’s total mortgage assets or 5 percent of total advances. Further, by law, thrift insti-
tutions were required to be members of their regional FHLB.
3. The Finance Board provides a link to each of the twelve capital plans on its Web site at <www.fhfb.gov/PressRoom/
Pressroom_capplans.htm>.
4. For assets, these charges are based on book values while off-balance-sheet items are converted into balance sheet
equivalents. 19. Primary mortgage insurance refers to insurance purchased by the homeowner. For nongovernment guaranteed loans,
private mortgage insurance companies sell such insurance. Information about private mortgage insurers can be found at
<www.privatemi.com>. 
20. This same protection is also afforded to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when mortgages are sold or securitized.
21. A software program called LEVELS, developed by Standard & Poor’s and used by the Chicago FHLB, determines these amounts. 
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mortgages on their books, and the market risks
associated with long-term fixed-rate mortgages,
including the funding risk and prepayment risk, are
borne by the FHLB. 
In the MPF Program, the credit risk associated
with conforming mortgage loans is structured into
several layers, or tranches. This approach, similar to
that for many private-market asset securitizations,
involves concentrating credit risk in lower tranches
that are subordinate to the claims of senior tranches.
As a result, each lower-level tranche acts as a credit
enhancement for all the higher-level tranches. The
FHLB maintains credit exposure only by holding the
most senior tranche in an MPF transaction. 
Any loan sold into the MPF Program is secured
by residential real estate and must have either a
loan-to-value ratio below 80 percent or else primary
mortgage insurance. In a default situation, the
homeowner’s equity is tapped first as a method of
reducing losses. In this sense, the homeowner’s
equity always acts as the most subordinate tranche,
or the first-loss position. If the original loan-to-value
ratio of the mortgage exceeds 80 percent, any losses
beyond the homeowner’s equity up to 20 percent
of the home’s value will be covered by a required
primary mortgage insurance policy purchased by
the homeowner up to the amount consistent with
the 80 percent loan-to-value ratio.19 Taken together,
the borrower’s equity and primary mortgage insur-
ance ensure that both the lender and the FHLB are
covered for the first 20 percent of losses of the orig-
inal purchase price in a default.20 While this most
subordinate tranche in an MPF transaction depends
on individual loan performance, each of the more
senior tranches is evaluated at the pool level. 
In the MPF Program, the seller-member provides
the second layer of credit protection in the form of
a First Loss Account. For most MPF products, this
account is set at 1 percent of the original size of the
loan pool. Credit losses exceeding the borrower’s
equity and primary mortgage insurance, if any,
accrue to the First Loss Account and are realized as
discounts in the monthly credit enhancement fee
paid by the FHLB to its member. 
In the event that the First Loss Account is
exhausted, the seller-member provides the third
layer of protection for the FHLB by absorbing loss-
es up to a prespecified amount such that the prob-
ability of losses in excess of this layer are no more
than those faced by investors in AA-rated securi-
ties.21 The seller-member is required to hold risk-
based capital against the amount of this “secondary
cash, receive a capital charge of 800 basis points
(8 percent). 
The market risk requirement for an FHLB is
computed as the sum of two parts. The first part
is the market value of the institution’s portfolio at
risk from movements in market prices (that is,
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commod-
ity prices, and equity prices) that could occur
during periods of market stress; in such cases a
Finance Board–approved internal market risk
model determines market values.5 The internal
model is required to provide an estimate of the
market value of the portfolio at risk such that the
probability of greater loss is no more than 1 per-
cent (that is, at or above the 99 percent confi-
dence interval). Further, the model must incor-
porate movements previously observed over 120-
day periods of economic stress. The second part
of the market risk capital calculation is the
amount, if any, by which the FHLB’s current
market value of total capital is less than 85 per-
cent of its book value. 
The capital requirement for operations risk is
generally 30 percent of the total capital charge
for credit and market risk. However, with Finance
Board approval, an FHLB can reduce this charge
to between 10 percent and 30 percent by either
providing an alternative methodology for calcu-
lating operations risk or by purchasing insurance
against such risks.
5. An FHLB may elect to substitute an internal cash flow model in place of the market risk model.22 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
commitment is the minimum amount of mortgage
loans that will be delivered during a specific period
of time. According to officials at the Chicago FHLB,
this size variation is related to the fixed costs. For
example, the MPF Plus product requires that the
seller-member purchase supplemental mortgage
insurance for which volume-based discounts may
be available from mortgage insurers. 
Second, credit enhancement fees paid by the
FHLB to seller-members are negotiated and vary
somewhat depending on the size of the deal, the
characteristics of the underlying mortgages, and
the performance of the underlying mortgages over
time. Product-specific differences reflect these
mortgage pool characteristics as well as possibly
a greater appreciation over time on the part of
the  FHLBs about providing incentives to seller-
members to provide quality loans. Indeed, for most
MPF products, part of the credit enhancement fee
is guaranteed while another portion is positively
related to loan performance.
Third, lenders may elect to sell previously closed
loans or originate loans on a flow basis on behalf of
their FHLB. The Original MPF, MPF 125, and MPF
Plus products are all geared toward closed loans
while MPF 100 is for flow purchases. Prior to a
November 2001 final rule published jointly by the
federal banking agencies,25 closed loan sales were
treated as recourse transactions, and flow loan sales
received direct credit substitute status for purposes
of risk-based capital treatment.26 Recourse trans-
actions required a lender to maintain risk-based
capital equal to the lesser of (1) 8 percent of the
original principal balance of the transferred loans
or (2) 100 percent of the retained credit expo-
sure. In contrast, direct credit substitutes were sub-
ject to an 8 percent capital requirement but only
on the face amount of the transaction. The rule
enacted in 2001 equalizes the treatment of similar
risks, irrespective of whether they are recourse or a
direct credit substitute.27 Presumably, these regula-
tory changes have significantly reduced the appeal
of MPF 100 to FHLB members. 
Fourth, while First Loss Accounts generally are
1 percent of the original pool amount, the secondary
credit enhancements provided by seller-members
vary substantially. For all the conventional MPF
products, the secondary credit enhancements are
established based on a proportion of the loan pool at
closing (20–200 basis points).28 The variation in the
size of the enhancement is based primarily on the
quality of the underlying loans since this protection
is established in such a way that the expected credit
loss accruing to the FHLB is no worse than that for
credit enhancement” since it is considered a con-
tingent liability. Finally, any residual losses would
be borne by the FHLB.
A simple example can be constructed to illus-
trate how credit losses are allocated in an MPF
transaction. Assume that a member sells 100 loans
to its FHLB, each secured by properties valued at
$300,000 and with a loan-to-value ratio of 85 per-
cent. This transaction also involves the establish-
ment of a First Loss Account totaling $300,000, or
1 percent of the original loan pool size of $30 mil-
lion. If a loan defaults in this case and if the house
is sold (net of expenses) for $225,000, the $75,000 in
losses accrues as follows. First, the borrower will lose
her 15 percent equity, or $45,000. Second, the pri-
mary mortgage insurer will pay the FHLB $15,000.
Finally, the remaining $15,000 in losses will be cred-
ited to the FHLB from the First Loss Account and
debited on the credit enhancement fees paid to the
seller-member. In this example, losses do not
exceed the value of the First Loss Account and
hence (1) the seller-member does not bear direct
losses related to the secondary credit enhancement
and (2) the FHLB bears no losses.
Currently, the MPF Program offers four products
for conventional mortgage loans (Original MPF,
MPF 100, MPF 125, and MPF Plus), which are sum-
marized in the table on page 24.22 These products
are distinguished by differences in (1) the required
minimum size of the master commitment, (2) the
monthly credit enhancement fees paid to the seller-
member by the FHLB, (3) whether closed loans or
loans made on a flow basis are delivered, 23 (4) the
structure of the seller-members’ secondary credit
enhancement, and (5) the seller-members’ risk-based
capital treatment. While the differences among the
products primarily reflect refinements in the MPF
Program over time, some products may appeal to
only certain groups of FHLB members.24
The first difference among the MPF products is
that the required size of the master commitments
varies from $5 million to $100 million. The master
The risk-sharing arrangements inherent in
the Mortgage Purchase Programs are similar
to those for the MPF products: the seller-
member manages most of the credit risk,
and the FHLB manages the market risk.22. There is also an MPF product for loans guaranteed by either the Federal Housing Administration or the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
23. Closed loans refer to loans already on the balance sheet of the seller-member. By contrast, flow loans refer to those in which
an FHLB provides the funding at closing and legally owns the loan at its inception. 
24. Unfortunately, the Chicago FHLB was unwilling to share information related to either the number of institutions using each
product or the volume of mortgages purchased by participating FHLBs under each product. 
25. See Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes, and Residual Interests in Securitizations, Federal Register 66
(230), November 29, 2001, 59614. This rule was effective January 1, 2002.
26. Recourse generally refers to the credit risk that a banking organization retains in connection with the transfer of its assets;
a direct credit substitute generally refers to any arrangement in which a banking organization assumes credit risk from
third-party assets or from other claims that it has not transferred.
27. Under the new rules, assets with a public rating of BBB or higher require 8 percent risk-based capital, those rated BB require
16 percent risk-based capital, and unrated exposures require 100 percent risk-based capital. While the secondary credit
enhancements in an MPF transaction are not publicly rated, the Chicago FHLB has petitioned the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council to allow them to be rated internally using Standard & Poor’s LEVELS software. 
28. The exception to this is the Original MPF, under which the First Loss Account is funded at 4 basis points times the annual
interest payments in the loan pool. 
29. Many of the largest mortgage insurers offer this pool-level coverage. 
30. The applicable fees would include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac credit guarantee fees, servicing fees, and trust expenses.
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a AA-rated security. In lieu of the off-balance-sheet
credit guarantee, MPF Plus requires supplemental
mortgage insurance, the cost of which is also tied
primarily to the underlying loan quality. 
Finally, MPF programs reduce regulatory risk-
based capital charges to seller-members, with the
reduction depending on the type and amount of
secondary credit enhancement provided, which in
turn depend on the quality of the underlying loans.
Using MPF 125, for example, a seller-member faces
a 25 basis point risk-based capital requirement for
credit risk, reflecting the total amount of the sec-
ondary credit enhancement. Larger members are
more likely to actively manage their risk-based cap-
ital position and hence be more sensitive to the
required capital associated with MPF products. 
Mortgage Purchase Programs. The risk-
sharing arrangements inherent in the Mortgage
Purchase (MP) Programs are similar to those for
the MPF products: the seller-member manages
most of the credit risk, and the FHLB manages the
market risk. Nevertheless, there are important dif-
ferences: the MP Programs permit only closed loan
sales and generally do not provide monthly credit
enhancement fees to seller-members. 
Under the Mortgage Purchase Programs, credit
risk is segmented into four tranches. Just as in the
MPF Program, the first layer of protection in a mort-
gage default is at least 20 percent of the house’s
value as provided by the borrower’s equity and sup-
plemented by primary mortgage insurance, if neces-
sary. A Lender Risk Account acts as the second layer
of protection against losses on MP Program loans in
excess of borrower equity and primary mortgage
insurance. The Lender Risk Account is maintained
by the member at the FHLB in an amount of 30–50
basis points of the original loan balance. If the
Lender Risk Account is exhausted for a particular
mortgage pool, additional losses are covered by a
supplemental mortgage insurance policy, which acts
as the third layer of protection.29 As in the MPF
Program, the probability of losses in excess of the
supplemental mortgage insurance policy is no more
than that faced by investors in AA-rated securities.
The FHLB accepts this remaining credit risk. 
Unlike MPF Programs, the MP Programs do not
guarantee credit enhancement income to their seller-
members. However, if the loans are performing after
five years, seller-members may receive monthly
dividends from the Lender Risk Account based on
a predetermined scale. Discussions with the Seattle
FHLB indicate that it interprets federal banking
regulations pertaining to risk-based capital as
requiring seller-members to treat Lender Risk
Accounts as assets and hold capital against their
fair values on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac operate two lines of business: a
credit guarantee business and an investment port-
folio. The credit guarantee business involves insur-
ing the timely payment of principal and interest
on the mortgage-backed securities they issue. The
investment portfolio consists primarily of mortgages
and mortgage-backed securities that they purchase
and hold.
The two GSEs create mortgage-backed securi-
ties by pooling mortgage loans together in a trust
and then selling interests in the trust. Payments to
security holders are made in the following way: a
servicer (often the lender) collects the mortgage
payments from borrowers, and, after deducting















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s31. The statutory minimum capital requirement has been the binding capital requirement for both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
since its implementation in 1996. Their risk-based requirements, which became effective in 2002, have not yet served as a
constraint. 
The 45 basis point capital requirement for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s off-balance-sheet mortgage credit guarantees
is lower than the credit risk charge for depository institutions in part because the GSEs benefit from nationwide diversifi-
cation in their credit risk portfolios. 
32. Jones (2000) discusses this type of “regulatory capital arbitrage” in greater detail.
33. The reduction in the interest rate from 7 percent to 6.75 percent reflects a 25 basis points guarantee fee. Further, the actual
coupon on the mortgage security would be 6.5 percent, but the lender would earn an additional 0.25 percent from servicing.
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in turn pays investors. The securities created by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are either pass-through
securities or real estate mortgage investment con-
duits (REMICs). The pass-through structure is
most common and involves security holders owning
undivided interests in the pool. REMICs, by con-
trast, are multiple-class securities in which security
holders have varying payment priorities (short,
intermediate, and long) based on the realization
of prepayments.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acquire mortgage
credit risk by a swap program and a cash program.
Under the swap program, a lender selects and pools
a group of mortgages and swaps them for mortgage-
backed securities issued and guaranteed by Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac that represent an interest in
the same pool. Under the cash program, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac simply purchase mortgage loans
from lenders in exchange for cash. Subsequently,
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac may elect to pool some
of these mortgages as collateral for a mortgage-
backed security offering or simply hold the loans in
their portfolio as an investment. 
The swap program allows a mortgage lender to
shed the credit risk associated with a pool of mort-
gages in exchange for the lender paying Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac a guarantee fee on the order of
20 basis points annually of the outstanding princi-
pal balance of the loan pool. The swap program
allows for a significant break in the lender’s risk-
based capital requirements and has thus created a
significant incentive for lenders to hold mortgages
in the form of a security instead of as individual
loans. The cash program allows the lender to remove
all of the credit and interest rate risk associated
with the loan pool because the lender simply sells
the loan. Under either program, a lender can con-
tinue to service the loans.
Competition in the Secondary Conforming
Mortgage Market
F
annie Mae and Freddie Mac together became
responsible for the credit risk on almost $1.5 tril-
lion in conforming mortgages originated in 2002
through their swap and cash programs (Inside
Mortgage Finance 2003a). This amount was 78 per-
cent of the $1.9 trillion in conforming mortgage
originations that year (Inside Mortgage Finance
2003b). This tremendous concentration of credit
risk at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is due in large
part to existing risk-based capital treatment of
mortgage-related credit risk by the federal banking
agencies. Box 2 summarizes the regulatory capital
standards for banks. 
As noted in Box 2, adequately capitalized banks
are required to hold at least 400 basis points of risk-
based capital against mortgage loans and 160 basis
points of capital against AAA-rated mortgage-
backed securities. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
themselves are also subject to a minimum capital
requirement of 45 basis points for mortgage credit
risk.31 As a result, under the current risk-based cap-
ital rules, when a pool of mortgages is securitized
with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac with no change in
aggregate risk, the financial system is required to
hold only 205 basis points of capital, or about half as
much.32 Nevertheless, market participants view the
actual credit risk associated with conventional con-
forming mortgages to be significantly less than
these regulatory capital requirements. For example,
realized loss rates on Fannie Mae’s and Freddie
Mac’s mortgage portfolios were only 1 basis point
(0.01 percent) in 2000 and 2001. 
The mispricing of mortgage credit risk in terms
of regulatory capital requirements allows a depos-
itory institution to securitize loans and free up cap-
ital to acquire more assets. This process can be
illustrated by a simple example in which a lender
holds a $25 million pool of thirty-year fixed-rate
loans with a 7 percent interest rate. The lender may
either (1) hold $1 million of capital against the
$25 million in loans earning 7 percent interest or
(2) hold $400,000 in capital against $25 million in
GSE mortgage-backed securities that earn 6.75 per-
cent.33 Thus, the lender could free up $600,000 in
capital through securitization.
While regulatory capital requirements appear to
shape depository institutions’ incentives to share risk
with the secondary mortgage market, the FHLB mort-
gage programs may ultimately affect the way in which26 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
T
his summary of bank capital requirements
focuses particularly on requirements for resi-
dential mortgage loans.1 The summary begins with
a discussion of the capital definitions and minimum
and risk-based capital requirements, which are
implemented and enforced by the three federal
banking agencies: the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). This discussion draws heavily
from the appendix in U.S. Treasury (2001). The
specific changes to international risk-based capital
standards being proposed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision that relate to residential
mortgages also are explained.
The federal banking agencies define total cap-
ital as the sum of core capital (tier 1) and supple-
mentary capital (tier 2).2 Tier 1 capital includes
common stock, noncumulative, perpetual pre-
ferred stock; and minority interests in the equity
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. Tier 2 cap-
ital is made up of cumulative perpetual preferred
stock, allowances for loan and lease losses, and
hybrid instruments that combine debt and equity
features. Tier 2 also includes subordinated debt
and limited amounts of unrealized gains on equity
securities. Deductions from capital include good-
will and other intangibles and investments in
certain subsidiaries. 
Banks are required to meet two minimum capi-
tal requirements: (1) a minimum leverage ratio,
which is a ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets of
4 percent, and (2) a total risk-based capital ratio,
which is a ratio of total capital to risk-weighted
assets of 8 percent.3 The risk-based system assigns
each class of assets a risk weight of 0 percent,
20 percent, 50 percent, or 100 percent. Under this
scheme, residential mortgage loans have a 50 per-
cent risk weight, and AAA-rated mortgage-backed
securities are weighted at 20 percent. 
All FDIC-insured depository institutions are
also subject to a regulatory system of prompt cor-
rective action, which classifies depository institu-
tions into five capital categories: well capitalized,
adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, signifi-
cantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapi-
talized. These capital categories are defined in
terms of four capital measures: a total risk-based
capital ratio, a tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, a
leverage ratio, and a statutory tangible equity ratio
of 2 percent, below which a bank is deemed to be
critically undercapitalized. To be well capitalized,
a bank must have a total risk-based capital ratio of
10 percent, a tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of 6 per-
cent, and a leverage ratio of 5 percent.4
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
is also in the process of implementing a new capi-
tal accord, commonly referred to as Basel II.
According to Ferguson (2003), the U.S. federal
banking agencies propose that only banks with sig-
nificant foreign exposures be subject to the new
accord—all under the “advanced internal-ratings-
based approach.”5 However, any bank meeting
the infrastructure requirements of the advanced
ratings-based approach would be allowed to
choose to be subject to Basel II. At this time, it
appears that only ten of the largest U.S. banks will
be subject to the new capital rules, with about
another ten expected to opt in. Nevertheless, these
twenty large banks account for 99 percent of the
foreign assets and two-thirds of all domestic bank-
ing assets held by U.S. banks. 
The treatment of residential mortgages under
Basel II’s advanced internal-ratings-based approach
requires estimates, derived from statistical models,
of the probability of default, loss given default,
BOX 2
Regulatory Capital Standards for Banks
1. Capital definitions and requirements for thrifts are generally similar to those for banks, but those faced by credit unions
are quite different. See U.S. Treasury (2001, appendix) for a side-by-side comparison.
2. The capital definitions can be found in 12 C.F.R. at part 3, app. A (OCC); part 325, app. A (FDIC); and part 208, app. A
(FRB).
3. The capital requirements can be found in 12 C.F.R. at part 3, app. A (OCC); sec. 325.103(b)(2) (FDIC); and sec.
208.43(b)(2) (FRB). 
Tier 2 capital may count toward meeting the 8 percent risk-based capital requirement but only up to 50 percent of
the total capital requirement.
4. The prompt corrective action provisions can be found in 12 C.F.R. at sec. 1831o; part 6 (OCC); part 325, subpart B
(FDIC); and part 208, subpart B (FRB). 
5. The Basel II proposal includes three different approaches: the standardized approach, the foundation internal- ratings-
based approach, and the advanced internal-ratings-based approach. The Bank for International Settlement’s Web site at
<www.bis.org> includes a number of consultative papers that provide both background and technical details related
to Basel II.34. For example, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s average losses of about 1 basis point per year suggest an adjusted average
price of 11 basis points for mortgage pools guaranteed by FHLB mortgage program participants. Thus, the price differential
would narrow from 10 basis points to 9. 
35. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac attempt to mitigate adverse selection through their underwriting guidelines and automated
underwriting systems, which use credit bureau data to construct credit scores that rank order the riskiness of loan appli-
cants. In fact, preliminary empirical evidence by Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Sanders (2003) suggests that securitized mort-
gage loans experience lower defaults than those retained on a depository institution’s portfolio.
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mortgage credit and market risks are shared. By pay-
ing seller-members credit enhancement fees, the
FHLB mortgage programs essentially put FHLB mem-
bers in competition with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
in the mortgage credit guarantee business. 
To understand the options for FHLB members,
one can compare the FHLB mortgage programs
with the cash programs offered by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. In both cases, the member sells the
market risk associated with a mortgage pool and
retains the servicing rights. The difference is
whether the credit risk is sold (as in the Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac cash programs) or retained (as in
FHLB mortgage programs). The choice between
the two depends on the credit insurance fees and
regulatory capital charges associated with the
respective alternatives.
At first glance, it would seem that the pricing of
mortgage guarantees varies significantly between the
MPF Program and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On
average, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge about
20 basis points annually while depository institutions
participating in the MPF Program charge about 10
basis points. However, there are two reasons why a
direct comparison of these figures is misleading. 
To begin this comparison, it’s useful to think
about the components of an insurance premium:
provisions for expected losses, administrative costs,
and profit. The premium charged by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac includes all of these components. But
premiums charged by FHLB members in an MPF
transaction do not include expected losses; losses
are instead attributed to the First Loss Account and
realized as discounts on the credit enhancement fee
paid by the FHLB. If the member were to directly
pay out annual expected losses, the average credit
enhancement fee charged to the FHLB would be
slightly larger than 10 basis points.34
A second reason that the pricing differential
could be misleading is that the FHLBs are retaining
the residual credit risk in the mortgage purchase
transactions. The risk of loss is extremely low—to
date, equivalent to a AA-rated security. Still, this
risk is not as low as the blanket insurance coverage
provided by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, whose
credit standing exceeds that of AAA-rated private
firms. If the seller-member also accepted the resid-
ual credit risk, it would likely serve to raise the
credit enhancement fees charged to the FHLBs.
Besides the differences in risk and the treatment
of expected losses, there are at least two other rea-
sons for the disparity in mortgage-credit guarantee
prices. First, unlike a depository institution insuring
the credit quality of its own mortgages, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac face potential adverse selection as
a third-party guarantor. The risk associated with
financial institutions’ providing riskier loans to the
secondary mortgage market could result in higher
insurance premiums being charged by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.35 Second, some pricing disparity
may reflect market power. Hermalin and Jaffee
(1996) suggest that the federal benefits embedded in
the charters of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the
attendant subsidy have limited competition in the
secondary conforming mortgage market by erecting
barriers to entry. If true, this argument would sug-
gest that the guarantee fees charged by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac exceed their marginal costs.
exposure at default, and maturity for pools of these
loans. These estimates are used, in turn, to con-
struct capital charges. In its most recent proposal,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is set-
ting a floor for the loss-given default parameter
at 10 percent (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2003, 15). To the extent that Basel II
allows banks to hold regulatory capital more com-
mensurate with the economic risk of loss, it should
reduce the largest banks’ incentives to share con-
forming mortgage risk with the secondary market.
However, the extent to which this sharing will
occur is dependent on whether regulatory restric-
tions placed on the internal models are binding and
force banks to hold excess capital against the credit
risk inherent in their mortgage portfolios. 28 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
mortgage programs and required capital by includ-
ing activity-based stock purchase requirements as a
part of their new capital plans required by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.38 FHLB members could
perceive this requirement as an additional cost to
participating in an FHLB mortgage program. 
FHLBs’ asset sales could take the form of either
selling marketable securities held in their portfolios,
mortgage assets, or both. While the former alterna-
tive is straightforward, the latter has only recently
been proposed. In December 2002, the Finance
Board approved an application by the Chicago
FHLB to operate a Shared Funding Program, under
which the institution may acquire collateralized
mortgage obligations and sell interests in such
assets to other FHLBs or FHLB System members.39
The first Shared Funding transaction occurred on
March 21, 2003.40 According to the Chicago FHLB,
this transaction involved privately placed multiple-
class certificates issued by One Mortgage Partners
Corporation, a subsidiary of Bank One, which in turn
is a member of the Chicago FHLB. The certificates
are backed by approximately $475 million in con-
ventional, conforming mortgages provided by affil-
iates of National City Mortgage and Wells Fargo
Home Mortgage. The Chicago, Des Moines, and
Pittsburgh FHLBs purchased the two senior tranches,
which were rated AAA and AA, while a Bank One
affiliate acquired the subordinate tranches. Thus,
the structure of the inaugural Shared Funding deal
was akin to a private-label REMIC transaction.41
Like the other FHLB mortgage programs, the
Shared Funding Program allows an FHLB to take on
market risk through its purchase of the senior secu-
rities, or those rated at least AA, while the member
takes on most of the credit risk through the subordi-
nated securities. However, two important distinc-
tions are that (1) the member retains some market
risk by holding the subordinate securities and
(2) liquidity is improved by holding the mortgage
pool in the form of a marketable security. Today, the
market risk associated with mortgages is available
to investors primarily through mortgage-backed secu-
rities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie
Mae.42 However, in the future, securities like the
Shared Funding Certificates may provide investors
with another choice for investing in and thereby
exposing themselves to the market risks associated
with conforming mortgages.
Potential Effects of Competition 
T
his analysis suggests that the FHLBs have the
ability to become competitors to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac in the secondary conforming
Looking at the average prices charged for con-
forming mortgage guarantees, the price of credit risk
using FHLB mortgage programs appears to be less
than that offered by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
This observation suggests that FHLB members have
an incentive to retain the credit risk and receive ser-
vicing and credit enhancement income. Whether they
actually do this will depend on how much capital they
are required to hold to reap the additional benefit.
The FHLB mortgage programs allow depository
institutions to hold risk-based capital only up to the
amount of their actual credit exposure.36 For exam-
ple, using MPF 125, an FHLB member may be
required to hold 25 basis points of regulatory capital
against its secondary credit enhancement. Thus, its
return on this equity is the ratio of the discounted
present value of the credit enhancement income (net
of credit losses and prepayments) to the required
regulatory capital. Buonafede, Hirani, and Yonker
(2002) provide this type of profitability analysis for
the FHLB mortgage programs and their variants.37
The FHLB mortgage programs appear to offer
attractive pricing for credit risk and have become
increasingly popular with members. Nevertheless, it
is unclear whether they can become significant com-
petitors to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because
their continued growth will require the FHLBs to
restructure their balance sheets by either selling
more equity stock to members or selling assets. 
Additional stock issuance may not be an attrac-
tive option for the FHLBs for a couple of reasons.
First, stock issuance is generally considered to be
costly relative to debt issuance because of asym-
metric information, agency costs, and taxes. This
cost differential is especially true for depository
institutions that enjoy access to the federal safety
net and GSEs that benefit from an implied federal
guarantee of their debt obligations. Second, only
members are eligible to purchase an FHLB’s rela-
tively illiquid stock, suggesting that potential buy-
ers may demand a premium. Some of the FHLBs
anticipated the relationship between expanded
Standard economic theory suggests that
increased competitive pressure applied by
the FHLBs will lower costs to mortgage 
originators—and ultimately homebuyers—
by increasing the supply of mortgage credit.36. Like a swap securitization with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the FHLB mortgage programs also allow for regulatory capital
arbitrage. For example, using MPF 125, an FHLB member could sell the market risk and retain the credit risk, holding 25
basis points of capital. Using the proceeds of the sale, it could then purchase a mortgage-backed security based on a similar
pool of loans and hold 160 basis points of capital against this asset. In this case, the FHLB member has reassumed both credit
and interest rate risk but is required to hold only 185 basis points of regulatory capital instead of 400 basis points.
37. However, Buonafede, Hirani, and Yonker (2002) incorrectly state that the Mortgage Purchase Programs do not require seller-
members to hold risk-based capital.
38. In the context of the mortgage programs, activity-based capital requirements could require members to purchase stock in
an amount equal to a fixed percentage of the dollar value of mortgages sold to their FHLB. A review of the individual capi-
tal plans indicates that eight of the twelve FHLBs will have an activity-based requirement tied to their mortgage programs.
39. However, the proposal does not seem to preclude an FHLB member from selling such interests outside of the FHLB System
in a private placement.
40. See the March 26, 2003, press release at <www.fhlbc.com>.
41. An interesting question concerning the shared funding program pertains to how it adds value relative to a private-label deal.
One answer to this, provided in Inside Mortgage Finance (2003c), is that the participating FHLBs were willing to pay a pre-
mium for the senior securities because they qualify as “acquired member assets” for purposes of the Finance Board’s
Financial Management Policy. As such, Shared Funding Certificates are not subject to the 300 percent of equity capital cap
on FHLB investments in mortgage-backed securities.
42. Ginnie Mae, or Government National Mortgage Association, is a government-owned corporation that guarantees securities
backed by loans guaranteed by the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Veterans Affairs. As of year-end
2002, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae had about $3 trillion in mortgage-backed securities outstanding. 
43. Estimates of the savings to mortgage borrowers and an understanding of how any savings accrue (through lower interest
rates or lower fees) would be an interesting topic for future research. 
44. See Black, Garabade, and Silber (1981) for empirical evidence related to the effect of the Ginnie Mae pass-through program
on FHA mortgage costs. 
45. Furthermore, after the FHLBs have some experience with a securitization program, they could seek to alter the regulatory
terms of the program, including the scope of permissible investors. 
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mortgage market. This competition can affect both
mortgage interest rates paid by consumers and GSE
risk profiles. 
Effect on interest rates. Standard economic
theory suggests that increased competitive pres-
sure applied by the FHLBs will lower costs to mort-
gage originators—and ultimately homebuyers—by
increasing the supply of mortgage credit. This
process may occur in a couple of ways.
First, entry into the credit guarantee market by
FHLB seller-members will put downward pressure
on the guarantee fees charged by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, at least for depository institutions that
are eligible for FHLB membership. Primary mort-
gage market participants will, in turn, pass such
savings on to consumers. As the earlier discussion
illustrates, any savings should be relatively small for
a given consumer although this savings could ulti-
mately be substantial in aggregate.43
Second, the operation of a viable securitization
program may eventually have additional implica-
tions for conforming mortgage market interest rates.
The extent of any such effect will depend on the
liquidity of these securities because, as securities
become more liquid, the interest rate demanded
declines because of the erosion of a liquidity pre-
mium. For asset-backed securities in a competitive
market, these lower secondary market interest rates
are then passed through to the primary market.44
The liquidity of FHLB-issued mortgage securities
will be predicated on having sufficient mortgage vol-
umes and the pool of eligible investors being suffi-
ciently large, or at least having significant aggregate
investment capacity to purchase these assets.
Federally insured banks and thrifts—all of which are
eligible for FHLB membership—together held
$2.7 trillion in residential mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities as of year-end 2002. If these
figures are indicative of ongoing demand for mortgage-
related assets, the membership requirement for
purchasing FHLB-issued mortgage securities is
unlikely to be a significant barrier to liquidity.45
To the extent that the Mortgage Partnership
Finance and Mortgage Purchase Programs lower
mortgage costs to conforming mortgage borrowers
and are a substitution in the funding choice by
FHLB members away from Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, consumer welfare may improve. However, to
the extent that lower mortgage costs induce
increased investment in housing, there may be
some partially offsetting negative welfare effects.
Such reductions in economic welfare arise when
subsidies (like the interest rate subsidies provided
by the three housing GSEs) encourage investment
in certain sectors of the economy at the expense of
less investment in other sectors. Frame and Wall
(2002) discuss the economic implications of hous-
ing finance subsidies in greater detail. 46. See, for example, Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) for a more complete discussion of the disciplinary role of fran-
chise value in financial services.
47. The OFHEO is an independent agency within HUD. 
48. For example, the market risks posed by the mortgage programs are the same as those for mortgage-backed securities hold-
ings. As of year-end 2002, the FHLB System maintained $96.4 billion in mortgage-backed securities on their consolidated
balance sheet.
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increases. If the growth in the FHLB mortgage pro-
grams comes exclusively at the expense of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, then any change in taxpayers’
contingent liability depends on the relative risk profile
of the three housing GSEs. By contrast, if this growth
arises from business otherwise headed for the private
market, taxpayers’ liability will expand proportionally. 
Conclusions
M
ortgage purchases are becoming an increas-
ingly large part of the FHLB System’s asset
base. Under the Mortgage Partnership Finance and
Mortgage Purchase Programs, seller-members guar-
antee most of the credit risk associated with the
mortgages while shedding the interest rate risk. As
a result, FHLB members have a more complete set
of options for funding conforming mortgage loans
via the three housing GSEs.
The FHLB mortgage programs increase competi-
tion in the secondary conforming mortgage market.
In terms of credit risk, the issuance of mortgage
credit guarantees makes all FHLB members poten-
tial competitors to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The current average prices for these credit guaran-
tees suggest that the FHLB programs are an attrac-
tive alternative. However, direct comparisons are
clouded by differences in the guarantee structures.
In terms of market risk, as the mortgage programs
continue to grow, the FHLBs may begin working
with members to structure securities bearing the
market risk of conforming mortgages. The Chicago
FHLB completed the first such deal in March 2003.
There are at least two potential effects of
increased competition in the secondary conforming
mortgage market. First, consumers could ultimately
benefit from lower mortgage costs because of a lower
cost of guaranteeing mortgage credit. However, the
savings would likely be small on a per dollar basis.
Second, increased competition may reduce the fran-
chise value of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in turn
possibly increasing risk-taking incentives for these
firms. Overall, how this competitive landscape
evolves bears close attention as it could have impor-
tant implications for mortgage markets.
Effect on GSE risk. All three housing GSEs
accrue federal subsidies through the market’s per-
ception of a federal guarantee of their debt obliga-
tions. It is well understood that such guarantees
create an incentive to increase risk taking. This ten-
dency is known as moral hazard. However, to the
extent that subsidies serve to erect barriers to entry
and reduce competition in a particular product
market, they provide firms with franchise value, or
positive expected economic profits. Firms with
franchise value face risk-averting incentives in order
to maintain the status quo.46
The risk profiles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
could change as a result of increased competition
from the FHLBs. That is, if competition reduces
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s expected profits
(returns), these GSEs will be faced with either
accepting the lower expected returns or taking on
more risk. Such increased risk-taking might mani-
fest itself through the selection of riskier invest-
ments, less effective hedging, holding less capital,
or entering new markets. As safety and soundness
regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) actively monitors the risk posi-
tions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) is responsible for the approval of any new
programs offered by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.47
These regulators should be aware of the effect of
increased competition on the risk-taking incentives
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
For the FHLBs, the mortgage programs expose
them to market risks that they have been managing
for some time although the assumption of residual
mortgage credit risk is new.48 Nevertheless, the prob-
ability of losses accruing to the FHLBs is small and
comparable with that arising from counterparties in
many other financial transactions. Thus, it would
seem that the Mortgage Partnership Finance and
Mortgage Purchase Programs should have no material
impact on the risk profile or risk-taking incentives
of the FHLB System. That said, anytime a GSE
expands, the size of the implied government guar-
antee increases and therefore taxpayer exposure31 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
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